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After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, “connecting the dots” became
the term used to correlate and analyze large quantities of information to
determine if there were defensible conclusions to be drawn from the data.
These conclusions could be to provide intelligence about pending terrorist
acts, the intentions of a person of interest (e.g. Saddam Hussein or Usama bin
Ladin), or how a country might act in a given situation.
The authors have put together a method book that incorporates critical
thinking, imaginative reasoning, and computer-based programs. The authors
have doctorates in fields such as Computer Science, Systems Engineering,
Operations Research, and Information Sciences. Despite their lack of
practical, hands on application of intelligence analysis, they have produced a
credible tome focused on following a given methodology to attain credible
analysis.
The authors define connecting the dots as “the evidential and inferential
reasoning required to draw defensible and persuasive conclusions from
masses of evidence of all kinds from a variety of sources” (xiv). The authors
outline the extant dilemmas intelligence analysts face in attempting to
produce those defensible and persuasive conclusions in an environment that
continuously adapts, morphs, and evolves. They also defend the analysts from
critics, pointing out that the critics have little understanding of the rigor
involved in the analytic process. Throughout the book, the authors provide
actual and hypothetical examples based on recent events to help the reader
apply the principles and paradigms they have just learned.
Given the innate complexities of intelligence analysis, the authors seek to
provide the proper framework to produce effective analysis. They advocate
inductive reasoning (as used by the fictional detective Sherlock Holmes) to
help the analyst identify necessary details (“trifles) to perform valid analysis.
They define this as “to be able to identify which combinations of trifles to
examine carefully and which ones to ignore” (28). They offer seven heuristics
or “magnets” to guide the analyst through the inductive process: believability,
chronology, question, hypothesis, argument, eliminative, and scenario. Each
magnet has its own set of tools and paradigms to employ in furtherance of
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testing how defensible and persuasive the analysis is. While every not magnet
is applicable to every situation, every magnet is a viable tool to assist the
analyst in determining if a piece of information warrants further examination
or not. If the book stopped here, it would be worth the cost due to these
magnets. Fortunately, there is much more to learn.
As the authors outline their methodology, they emphasize that evidence must
have relevance, believability (credibility), and inferential weight and provide a
tool to assess those factors. The analytic rigor and structure provided may not
apply to all situations encountered, yet it is a valid methodology from which
any analyst will derive benefit. As analysts work their way through an analytic
conundrum, they can determine relevance, believability, and credibility
through task decomposition, (divide and conquer). This involves breaking
complex, multi-layered hypotheses in small pieces and then reconstructing
them to reach a defensible and persuasive argument. The authors
continuously challenge the reader to reach further into the analytic problem
at hand to see if there are unexamined facets warranting further analysis. In
addition to a framework in which to analyze myriad streams of information,
the authors also discuss a methodology of how to evaluate the believability of
the data. This includes incorporating factors to evaluate the evidence such as
tangibility, competence, credibility, veracity, objectivity, and observational
sensitivity in cases of testimonial evidence or chain of custody.
As the analyst acquires information, it may be turned into varying
combinations of evidence that is harmonious, dissonant, or redundant. The
authors point the analyst into cognitive paths to help sort and de-conflict
these combinations to again “identify which combinations of trifles to
examine carefully and which ones to ignore” (158). In the process of
gathering data, analysts may encounter various types of uncertainty in the
available information: incompleteness, inconclusiveness, ambiguity,
dissonance, and imperfect believability. These in turn can be assessed and
measured using enumerative probabilities, non-enumerative probabilities,
epistemic probability (Bayesian networks), and Baconian probability.
As intelligence analysts ply their tradecraft, they must be cognizant of their
own biases (beliefs, opinions, and related behaviors) in order to filter them
out to provide objective analysis. These biases include evaluation of evidence,
varying perceptions of cause and effect, probability estimates, hindsight, and
evaluation of intelligence reports and available data. Many of these biases are
caused by human sources (HUMINT), persons in the chains of custody of the
evidence, and actual consumers of intelligence analysis.
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While the methodologies emphasize inductive reasoning and critical thinking,
its technical nature places it squarely in the arena of material for intermediate
or advanced students. While a beginner would also benefit from the material,
they would do better to employ this method once they have a wider sense of
context and experience.
This book is a solid contribution to the tradecraft of intelligence analysis. The
reader, upon completion of the book, has a wider, more diverse toolkit to
analyze available information. Using these tools, the analyst can focus on
what is important, discard what is not important, and determine if more
information is needed.
Mark J. Roberts, Subject Matter Expert
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